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Hungarian energy governance conveys a unique disposition, filled with contradic-
tions, lacking clarity, but reflecting centralized control at the highest echelons of
politics. Like many of its Central and Eastern European (CEE) neighbors, it is still
entrenched in preexisting producer-consumer relations that shape its amicable rela-
tions with Russia, while its accession to the European Union has led it to take on
disruptive climate and energy policy targets. The country’s energy transition has been
unfolding slowly, as the government maintains a moderate pace of action. The
diffusion of renewables continues to unfold in the shadow of other historical legacies,
most prominently Russia-sourced nuclear power technology, natural gas, and oil.
Power and control over energy corporations is concentrated in the hands of those
closely aligned with the government, and multilevel governance is subordinated to
anticipate or execute the objectives dictated by political leaders. Challenges mount in
the Hungarian sector as we move towards the 2030 and 2050 EU decarbonization
targets, which will pressure the government to implement much more disruptive
measures, severing and rewriting historical energy based ties.
Keywords
Energy governance · Hungary · Lock-in · Government control · Centralization ·
Energy transition
Introduction
Hungary’s energy system reflects the imprint of an energy system conveying typical
Central and Eastern European (CEE) patterns combined with Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán’s general approach to political economics. The energy scene is shaped by powerful
path dependencies: reliance on Russian hydrocarbons and nuclear technology as well as
relatively low GDP per capita leading energy bills to constitute a higher share in total
household expenditure. Motorization has been in full swing and GDP growth is higher
than the EU average, both driving a rise in energy and especially electricity consumption.
Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has not been a prominent issue until very
recently, due to deindustrialization and a related fall in emissions after the regime change
in 1989. EU targets concerning renewable energy and emissions from sectors not
included in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) pose a growing challenge for
the country, leading Hungary to engage in tug-of-war over how the energy transition’s
costs should be split between CEE and other Western EU states. Amidst these, PM
Orbán’s approach to energy governance has continued to primarily focus on exploiting
utility price controls for political gain, the nationalization of energy assets, and central-
izing control over the sector. Overall, Hungary shows few signs of being the exception
among the EU’s energy governance models. It shares amultitude of similarities with CEE
countries, while perhaps being a bit louder, more intractable, and intrusive than its
regional counterparts.
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The current form of Hungary’s energy system has co-evolved with the political
economics of the Orbán regime. Fidesz reshaped the fundamentals of the Hungarian
constitutional order and cemented its extensive rule over the country after it gained a
supermajority in the 2010 elections. The set of these all-encompassing changes
ushered in what some have referred to as “Orbánism,” despite its lack of a coherent
ideology and multiplicity of interpretations (Müller 2014). PM Orbán often positions
himself in defiance of the declining Western liberal order, lamenting the withering
away of traditional values and offering to restore those. Orbán (2014) claimed that he
aimed to establish an illiberal democracy, incorporating the convergence of nation-
alism and capitalism. His governance has also been assessed as a “hybrid regime”
(Filippov 2018), implying a competitive market coupled with authoritarian rule, or a
“postcommunist Mafia state” (Magyar 2016), a crony capitalist entity. Scheiring
(2018) describes this Hungarian regime as an authoritarian accumulative state in a
dependent market economy environment, which simultaneously incentivizes the
formation of a strong national capitalist class and multinational investment. The
“developmental state” arguments within the world-systems theory highlight the later
features and present Hungary as a country serving international capital and striving
to upgrade its standing in the global division of labor (Wilkin 2016).
Characterizing Hungary’s political economics as well as its embeddedness in
European and global relations of production are essential to understand the country’s
approach to energy governance. The aforementioned interpretations and approaches
of the Orbán regime treat local energy trends and developments differently. The
hybrid regime approach proposes that energy is a linchpin connecting Hungary to
other illiberal states, most notably Russia (Filippov 2018). The crony capitalist
narrative suggests that nationalization within the sector serves as a mode of politi-
cally motivated sectoral rent redistribution, while the related neo-utilitarian interpre-
tation describes the strong focus on reducing utility prices as an indelible mark of
excessive politicization of the matter (Magyar 2016). The accumulative state
approach argues that the sector was a target of the revolting national bourgeoisie
(Scheiring 2018). Dependency and world-systems theories focus on Hungary’s
reliance on importing hydrocarbons to ensure its competitive role in global supply
chains, leading it to shape intricate linkages with resource exporting countries, such
as Russia. This approach also suggests that Hungarian laggardness in climate
policies can be understood as an effort to maintain inexpensive inputs for multina-
tional companies. While all these features are true for Orbán’s Hungary, they also
indicate the complexity of local energy governance and its intractability within a
single existing theory.
The following chapter attempts to provide an overview of the focal mechanisms
shaping energy governance in Hungary. In section “Energy Legacies”, it explores the
historical legacies shaping the energy system in place today, by introducing the
country’s reliance on Russian hydrocarbon imports and nuclear technology. It then
turns to the composition of the country’s energy mix (section “Composition of the
Energy Mix”), providing an overview of the status quo, which indicates the potential
extent of an energy transition. Subsequently, it discusses the main actors in
Hungary’s energy scene and prevalent discursive themes (section “Political
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Institutions and Actors”). In section “Drivers of Energy Tranition”, the chapter
explores the drivers of an energy transition, where energy security will be a crucial
factor that the authors flesh out in more detail. After this, the chapter turns to the
specific strategies the government and the energy sector have adopted to meet energy
transition goals (section “Strategies and Instruments of Energy Transition”),
pertaining to both energy security and decarbonization, before discussing the char-
acteristics of Hungary’s multilevel governance in the sector (section “Coordination
Mechanisms and Multilevel Governance”). Finally, in section “Outcomes, Chal-
lenges, and Prospects of Energy Governance”we draw conclusions and discuss what
our findings imply for the energy sector’s governance in light of the need to
undertake an energy transition.
General Conditions of Energy Governance
Energy Legacies
Hungary was the third most energy dependent country of the 11 Eastern EU member
states in 2018 with an import ratio of 58.1% (Eurostat 2020a). By reclassifying
nuclear energy from domestic to imported fuel, warranted by Hungary’s importation
of the technology and source fuel (BP 2019a), the country’s dependency rate would
be over 73%. It would approach Lithuania’s 77.2%, the most dependent former
Eastern bloc state. Resource scarcity and declining production levels became well-
established trends after the early 1970s, resulting in a steep increase of Soviet
imports of electricity as well as fossil and nuclear fuels. Hungary established an
energy resource trade regime and constructed the physical infrastructure with the
Soviet Union between the 1960s and the1980s that resembled general Comecon
patterns (Szabo and Deak 2020). Basic patterns of energy relations still preserve the
imprints of the Socialist era. The first connection between the Soviet and Hungarian
oil networks was the Friendship (Druzhba) pipeline in 1962, still functioning as the
main route for imports. First gas deliveries from the Soviet Union arrived in 1975
through the Brotherhood (Bratstvo) pipeline. Between 1982 and 1987 four Soviet
VVER-440 nuclear blocs were constructed in Paks, still providing the bigger half of
domestic electricity supply. The rest of the electricity generation fleet consists of
different, primarily Soviet-era natural gas power plants and the lignite-based Mátra
Power Plant at Visonta, built between 1969 and 1972.
Energy dependency remained a recurring concern of Hungarian energy policy,
especially after the 1989 dissolution of the Soviet bloc, but policy-makers made
limited effort to change the situation. Affordability considerations – cheap and
convenient energy supplies for households in particular – constituted the top political
priority following the country’s regime change. In the early 1990s, this manifested in
excessive and politically supported gasification programs, while after the turn of the
millennium discourses on low utility prices became a distinguished field of domestic
political competition (Szabo and Fabok 2020). Affordability issues are considered a
legacy from the communist era. After the 1956 failed revolution, the initially
4 J. Szabo et al.
unpopular Kádár regime achieved social consolidation by making welfare conces-
sions to the masses. Trade-offs between political loyalty and economic benefits,
“Gulash communism” became a systematic feature of Hungary for the next 30 years,
creating an increasingly paternalistic-populistic embeddedness for upcoming gov-
ernments (Benczes 2016). The major expectation from regime change in the 1990s
was not necessarily related to political freedoms, but to higher living standards,
preserving broad social guarantees (a sort of “Gulash capitalism”). Consequently,
increased estrangement from emerging market institutions and democratic competi-
tion as well as nostalgia toward the Kádár regime developed amongst the populace
(Pap 2017).
Attitude towards Russia also remained relatively friendly following the system
change. Until 2010, Hungary had a quasi-bipolar political system, dominated by the
Russia-pragmatist leftist communist successor party and Russia-skeptical conserva-
tive forces. Since 2010, Viktor Orbán has transformed from a fierce Moscow-
opponent to a proponent, driving the positive views of Russia at both party and
societal level. Even the far-right nationalist party, Jobbik, has become pro-Russia
and only tiny green and liberal formations in the parliament maintain Russia-skeptic
positions. According to opinion polls conducted after the Russian–Ukraine conflict
in 2016, 58% of the respondents supported closer economic ties with Russia, 28%
opposed those, while one-third of the population could have even imagined political
rapprochement (35% for and 40% against) (Szvák 2016). Consequently, Hungary’s
perception and relations with Russia is a relatively weak driver to change the existing
energy status quo.
Ownership relations comprised another focal point of Hungarian energy policies.
Due to the government’s high indebtedness and austerity measures following the
regime change, it sold a significant part of the natural gas and electricity industry to
foreign multinationals in 1995. This early privatization and the accompanied estab-
lishment of an independent regulator to secure the 8% profit rate for new incomers
became a major cleavage between the political left and right (Mocsáry 2001; Báger
and Kovács 2004). Early privatization led to a colorful ownership pattern for the next
15 years. The nuclear energy generation and the electricity transmission system
operator (TSO) remained in the hands of a state-owned enterprise (SOE), MVM
(Hungarian Electricity Works). The oil industry and various parts of the gas sector
(most notably the gas TSO) came to be owned by domestic private actor, MOL.
Meanwhile, all other assets including electricity and gas distribution and a number of
power plants were sold to foreign, predominantly European, multinational corpora-
tions. After 2010, PM Viktor Orbán enlisted the energy sector as a strategically
important branch of the economy, where Hungarian ownership shall prevail. By the
end of his second term in office, foreign companies were mostly squeezed out by
regulatory means and/or purchased by local and state entities. Investments into the
electricity sector, for example, were major victims of the Orbán governments’
reforms (Eurostat 2020a, b). Investment intensity per consumption practically
halved after 2011, a decline that can be only partly explained by the financial crisis
and higher electricity imports. Initially this was due to voracious nationalization
efforts, but low sectoral profitability sustains due to utility rate setting. The outcome
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of these changes is that the Hungarian energy landscape became subject to strong
political control through formal and informal means, with little autonomy for the
regulator and increased statist attitudes in management and planning.
The government of Hungary welcomed EU policies and common governance in a
restrained manner and applied these initiatives selectively. Hungary was an early mover
to enhance natural gas interconnections and implement supply security policies, leading
EU efforts and taking advantage of supranational support following the 2009
Russian–Ukrainian gas disputes. The European Commission’s bids to further market
coupling and unbundling had a more selective reception and required longer adaptation.
Common climate policy objectives, especially regarding renewables and non-ETS
administrative measures, comprise the biggest emerging point of conflict between the
government of Hungary and its Western counterparts. The former has been foot-
dragging, accepting new targets only conditionally and under external pressure. 2017
GHG emissions may have been 31.9% lower, at 63.8 million tons of CO2 equivalent
(MtCO2eq), than 1990 figures of 93.8 MtCO2eq, but most of the decrease is due to the
deindustrialization during transition years following the collapse of the communist
regime. The trajectory of GHG emission declines have, however, reversed since 2015,
steadily rising in subsequent years (ITM 2020b). Meanwhile, few domestic drivers for a
more ambitious climate stance have been visible, and the Orbán government views the
matter through a lens of short-term cost-benefit calculations. Climate policy and energy
transition commitments largely rely on external, mainly Western and the European
Commission’s pressure as well as domestic industrial policy.
Hungarian energy policy has maintained its Russia-focus by renewing natural gas
and nuclear contractual relations, the preeminence of sovereignty and affordability of
energy policy, restored formal and informal statism, while firmlymaintaining its position
among climate laggards. Policy attitudes seem to be fairly stable under the Orbán
government, but institutions lack any solid fundamentals and have been subservient to
political objectives. Until 2010, policy controls over the industry were relatively weak,
usually set under the Ministry of Economy with rare interferences from the Prime
Minister’s side in issues such as Russia or hostile acquisition attempts from foreign
companies. After 2010, energy became a sector closely and actively managed at the
highest political level. PM Viktor Orbán takes an active decision-making role in a set of
major issues, while policy supervision became increasingly fragmented between various
entities whose roles were regularly reshuffled by the PM.
Composition of the Energy Mix
Hungary features a heavily import-dependent hydrocarbon-based energy system, pred-
icated on its legacies and shaping its approach to the sector’s governance. The country
used hydrocarbons to meet 69.2% of its gross inland consumption in 2018, dominated
by natural gas (31.0%) and closely followed by oil and petroleum products (30.3%).
Nuclear energy held a 15.0% share, exceeding both renewables and biofuels (10.5%) as
well as solid fossil fuels (7.9%) in gross demand (Table 1) (MEKH 2020f). In 2017, the
country’s GHG emissions amounted to 63.8 MtCO2eq not including land use, land use
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change, and forestry (LULUCF), with the energy sector accounting for 72% of emis-
sions (ITM 2020c). Hungary imports the bulk of its primary energy supply, apart from
domestically produced lignite. Regarding natural gas, the production-to-consumption
ratio has fallen below 20%. Hungarian gas production declined rapidly until 2015; since
then, it has grown slightly (MEKH 2020c). There were significant hopes for unconven-
tional gas, but this has proven to be an illusion. Approved in January 2020, Hungary’s
National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) states that natural gas production may
continue to grow through 2030, to which unconventional gas will only make a very
small contribution (ITM 2020c, 202–203). Oil production is growing much more
rapidly (MEKH 2020d), but despite a large oil field discovery, recently announced, it
will still be limited. According to the NECP, in 2030 oil production will be lower than
the current level, but increases will be seen in the mid-2020s. Currently, oil imports
account for around 90% of consumption (ITM 2020c, 31, 202).
Hungary’s final energy consumption has been quite fluctuant since the fall of the
communist regime with natural gas playing a key role in meeting demand. Between
2014 and 2017, total final energy consumption grew at a rate well above the EU
average, in-part reflecting wastefulness, but this trend stopped in 2018, and residen-
tial consumption declined (the latter is mainly because of the mild winter weather,
though) (Eurostat 2020a; MEHI 2019; MEKH 2020f). The residential sector has the
largest share in final energy demand (32.6% in 2018), followed by the transport
(26.9%) and the industrial sector (24.9%) (MEKH 2020f). The residential sector
primarily relies on gas (48.6% in 2018), followed by renewables (23.6%), electricity
(16.8%), derived heat (8.0%), coal and coal products (1.6%), as well as oil and
petroleum products (1.3%) (Table 2) (MEKH 2020e). Hungary’s transportation
sector, on the other hand, consumes petroleum products to meet rapidly growing
demand. In 2018, 62.2% of consumption was diesel (MEKH 2020f) leading
Hungary’s Russian crude-based oil refiner to optimize for diesel production.
The share of renewables in gross final energy consumption only reached 12.5% in
2018, most of which is in the heating sector (Fig. 1) (ITM 2018; MEKH 2020h).
Solid biomass is the dominant renewable energy source, amounting to 77.3% of
renewable consumption in 2018 (MEKH 2020g). This is almost exclusively consti-
tuted of firewood, with straw playing a measurable, but relatively minuscule role.
The majority of this biomass is consumed by the household sector, also entailing that
Hungary’s ability to meet its EU renewable energy target heavily relies on household
biomass consumption.
The relative role of nuclear, coal, natural gas as primary fuels, and that of
electricity imports have been volatile in Hungary’s electricity supply in past years,
changing with market and policy conditions (Fig. 1). Electricity consumption
increased until 2007 to 43.9 TWh, followed by a fall in 2009. The years 2010–
2014 brought stagnation (42–43 TWh), but consumption has been growing since
2015 and climbing to over 46 TWh in 2018 (Eurostat 2020c). Hungary’s domestic
generation is heavily reliant on the Paks Nuclear Power Plant and the Mátra Power
Plant. Gas comprised the largest share in 2007 and 2008, followed by nuclear, and
coal was a distant third. Market shares were reshuffled by the mid-2010s, when
nuclear’s role increased to over 50%, while coal overtook natural gas in relative


















































































































































































































































































































































Energy Governance in Hungary 9
importance. These developments were paired with a surge of electricity imports to
more than 30% of demand in 2014 and 2015, compared to around 9% in 2007 and
2008 (Eurostat 2018a, 2020c; MEKH 2020a). Shifts have been the result of (1) nat-
ural gas’ competitive disadvantage, (2) low carbon prices, and (3) low electricity
prices (Stern 2017; KWK-Index n.d.; Sandbag n.d.).
As climate consideration came to play a growing role, coal lost its relative
competitiveness vis-a-vis natural gas, in part due to the rise of carbon prices since
2015 (BP 2019b; KWK-Index n.d.; Sandbag n.d.). Coal’s role in Hungary’s elec-
tricity generation dwindled and natural gas’ increased. Nuclear’s and electricity
imports’ roles have slightly decreased, while renewables’ relative role has climbed,
reaching 11.6% in 2018 (Fig. 2). However, biomass continues to play the role of the
largest source of renewable electricity generation, the sustainability of which is still
disputed by various stakeholders (EASAC 2019). Hydro energy was the second
most important source of renewable electricity until 2008, but wind energy took its
place between 2009 and 2017 (Fig. 2). Due to the government’s failure to grant new
wind permits and the subsequent de facto ban on new wind projects, emerging solar
PV overtook wind in 2018. Despite some changes, the nuclear–gas–coal–biomass
electricity generation composition has continued to dominate the sector.
Political Institutions and Actors
Energy governance is highly fragmented in Hungary, with influence over policy and
market developments divided between multiple ministries and private actors. In
theory, the Ministry of Innovation and Technology is at the center of energy policy,








Heating and cooling Gross electricity consumption Transport Gross final energy consumption
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Fig. 1 Share of energy from renewable sources in Hungary, by sector, 2006–2018 (%). (Source:
MEKH 2020h)
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the last say in prominent issues. The Ministry of Innovation and Technology has held
the responsibility for planning activities and developing a strategy for energy and
climate issues since 2018. However, according to the organization and operational
rules of the ministry, the state secretary in charge is only responsible for climate
policy related issues and “establishing the strategic conditions for energy business”
(ITM 2019). The state secretary has been particularly active in fields of renewables,
designing and managing related subsidies and auctions, as well as streaming invest-
ments into efficiency and environmental projects.
Natural gas issues and their links to foreign affairs are managed by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. Since 2014, when the Orbán-confidant Péter Szijjártó was
nominated to foreign minister, negotiations about gas pipelines, long-term supply
contracts and import prices, regional and interconnectivity projects firmly belong to
this unit of the government. While it is officially mandated to only coordinate energy
and climate diplomacy (KKM 2019), it has a more active role in natural gas and
some oil-related issues. The ministry’s elevated status largely stems from strong
personal ties between Minister Szijjártó and PM Orbán and their bid to closely
control all gas-related issues.
In principle, the nuclear industry and the management of the new nuclear blocs’
construction exclusively belong to the “Minister without Portfolio for maintaining the
capacity of the Paks nuclear power plant.” Despite the existence of such a portfolio,
related issues are also regularly discussed at Putin–Orbán summits and the Prime
Minister’s Office has also been involved since the onset of the project – represented at
ministerial level since 2018. The separation of the project can be justified by its


















Oil and petroleum products




2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Fig. 2 Gross electricity production in Hungary, by fuel, 2006–2018 (%) (Source: Own calculations
based on Eurostat (2018a, b) for the years 2006–2013, and MEKH (2020a, b) for the years 2014–
2018) [*Other combustible fuels ¼ industrial waste + nonrenewable municipal waste + other
sources]
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GDP), its sensitivity with respect to domestic policy and obvious delays in its comple-
tion. Besides low utility prices for households, the Paks II project constitutes the other
fixed points of any governmental thinking on the future energy landscape.
While these players remain relatively visible, the Minister without Portfolio in
charge of National Assets also takes on an important role in the domestic energy
scene. Ministries often controlled SOEs in their respective fields in the past; but
ownership control has been separated from policy supervision under Orbán’s gov-
ernments and state ownership has dramatically increased. The controlling ministry
shall allocate investment funds for respective development projects within SOEs,
can veto any major decision, as well as approve all nominations in the management
and board. Theoretically, this should not be a problem, as long as the government can
preserve its unity, but the separation between corporate and political control certainly
represent a potential point of conflict. This affects the energy scene primarily through
its say in the governance of Hungarian Electrical Works Plc. (MVM), the country’s
utility behemoth.
A further key actor is the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory
Authority (MEKH), established by the National Assembly of Hungary in its current
form in 2013. In doing so, its scope of competences was broadened with the waste,
water, and district heating sectors, but its price setting and controlling authority vis-
a-vis the government were weakened. MEKH pursues conventional regulatory
activities such as licensing, supervision, and statistical data collection. Nevertheless,
its most important duty is tariff-setting and keeping the administratively managed
pricing system in the household sector under the government’s firm control.
Despite high levels of foreign ownership in the past, national private and state
companies have always enjoyed a good deal of legal and financial support from the
government. MOL was defended from hostile takeover attempts by Russian (2001,
2011) and Austrian (2009) companies. The close links between the government and
MOL led the latter to cooperate in strategy-design and implementation. These
included the creation of the strategic gas storage after 2009 and the development
of the country’s energy interconnections. Alongside MOL, a number of private
entities play focal roles in the domestic energy scene. German E.ON’s purchase of
MOL’s natural gas wholesale and storage firms drove foreign ownership in the sector
to a peak. Due to their multinational corporate strategies, foreign companies became
less involved in Hungarian policymaking and tensions at the regulatory level were
always relatively high between private and public actors. The issue’s relevance has
declined since the mid-2010s due to extensive (re-)nationalization.
At the heart of this multiactor energy system is PM Viktor Orbán and the
parliamentary majority his party has held since 2010. This horizontally fragmented
and vertically integrated decision-making system relies on his political interests,
circumstances, and room for maneuver regarding energy policy. He uses selected
issues from the energy field for political purposes, including control over utility
prices, as well as Russia-policy and nuclear developments. Simultaneously, growing
climate consciousness offers increasing gains for various opposition parties. Fidesz
followed a climate-neutral, mildly climate skeptical conservative line, putting the
government into the defensive, against a mix of green and liberal parties. Changes in
this approach are only beginning to surface.
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A final cluster of actors active in Hungary’s energy sector is composed of those
which are neither government entities nor private corporations involved in the
energy supply chain. This includes independent nongovernmental organizations,
such as Energiaklub, National Society of Conservationists – Friends of the Earth
Hungary, or Greenpeace Hungary, which have had a limited capacity to shape policy
and have frequently faced hostility from Orbán governments.
Discourse on Energy Issues
The themes of energy prices, energy security, ownership of energy assets, and
nuclear power have been at the center of energy discourses in Hungary, with climate
changes’ importance only recently rising. The most pervasive energy discourse in
Hungary pertains to price, which has been a key political issue for decades (Szabo
and Fabok 2020). The Hungarian government has traditionally taken a paternalist
role in society dating back to the communist era. Governments have been vocal
about subsidizing prices, building political capital from this undertaking. Ensuring
low prices has also been intertwined with a dominant discourse of energy security,
entailing the government’s and companies’ ability to secure access to inexpensive
energy resources. This has also warranted the state’s objective to consolidate domes-
tic ownership of energy assets that underpinned low prices and secure supplies. The
Paks nuclear power plant’s role at the heart of Hungary’s energy system has made it a
key constituent of domestic energy discourse, especially since MVM launched the
planning and construction of its successor, Paks II. These four interlinked discourses
have dominated the Hungarian energy scene essentially for decades, but have
recently been expanded with climate change primarily in light of European and
global developments.
Hungarian governments have a long-standing history in controlling energy
prices, by developing domestic deposits or negotiating favorable import terms.
Hungary has long produced and consumed fossil fuels, but this was especially
accelerated when governments of the communist era accelerated industrialization
(KBM 2008; VGF and HKL 2013). Demand for energy quickly outpaced supply and
the country became reliant on inexpensive soviet hydrocarbon imports during the
second half of the twentieth century (Hoffman and Dienes 1985). These factors laid
the foundation to a discourse emanating from essentially all cabinets of the govern-
ment and the party that focused on sustaining access to imports and low costs, which
continued following the regime change. Energy prices remained a pervasive political
issue that political parties heatedly debated, while Hungary’s oil and natural gas
major, MOL, provided energy to consumers at subdued prices, incurring the asso-
ciated losses. Meanwhile, broader society expected the state to find a way to sustain
low end-user prices. The need for the state to take action to secure access to
inexpensive energy sources was especially pertinent given the technological and
infrastructural lock-ins (e.g., an extensive natural gas network) that also drove a
proliferating energy poverty throughout the country (Bouzarovski et al. 2016).
Political parties in Hungary have avoided raising energy prices by all means possible
after being voted into office by the populace. The confluence of liberalization and high
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global energy prices led to climbing prices in the 2000s, culminating under the rule of the
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) (Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2006). By this time, EU-backed
liberalization efforts had been implemented by the government and E.ON had acquired a
large part of the Hungarian energy sector, but these actors’ discursive emphasis on a
competitive market benefitting the consumers did not materialize. PM Orbán-led Fidesz
launched a campaign for the need to maintain low energy prices and reclaim energy
assets, contributing to their win at the polls in 2010, 2014, and 2018. In the run up to the
2014 election, “utility [price] reductions” [rezsicsökkentés] was the dominant discursive
theme of the campaign and after winning office. Fidesz widely publicized its overhead
price reductions and launched an era of the “fight for utility prices” [rezsiharc] (Böcskei
2015; Horváth 2016). The “fight for utility prices” included a bid to shape prices and to
allow the state to nationalize energy assets, concentrating ownership in public companies
(Mihályi 2018). Fidesz reversed MSZP-led governments’ actions to open the Hungarian
energy sector for foreign investors, which it already began in 2011 with a large stock-
purchase share in the national oil company MOL and followed with further acts of
sectoral consolidation after its 2014 re-election. The guiding rhetoric the government has
deployed claims that energy assets are strategic and therefore should be Hungarian-
owned, while this form of ownership also ensures energy security.
The nationalization of energy assets in Hungary is embedded in the wider discourse
of supply security, given the import dependence that the country has built in past
decades (see section “Composition of the Energy Mix”). This is predicated on the
country’s need to exploit domestically available resources, maintain amicable relations
with Russia, and diversify import routes. The Hungarian energy system is set up in a
manner where actors throughout the supply chain rely on good relations with Russia,
ensuring a secure supply of energy resources at subdued prices. Consequently, there is
a strong Russia-friendly element of the government’s foreign policy, which has
become especially pronounced and discursively emphasized in recent years under
Fidesz governments. This has been accompanied with government-backed initiatives
to diversify energy import sources and routes, ushering in a strong focus on natural gas
pipeline politics especially following the 2006 and 2009 natural gas crises (Weiner
2017). Decision-makers from the public and private sector extensively discussed large
infrastructure projects including the Nord Stream, Nabucco pipeline, South Stream,
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania–Hungary LNG project
(AGRI), Krk LNG, Turkish Stream, Nord Stream 2, the Bulgaria–Romania–Hungary–
Austria pipeline (BRUA), and interconnectors to neighboring countries (e.g., Slovakia
and Croatia). Representatives of the EU and the USA have continuously articulated
their support for undertakings delivering non-Russian natural gas. Many of these
projects were heatedly debated for years, but few have come to fruition given the
preexisting lock-ins of the energy system and Hungary’s unwillingness to pay the
surplus price for non-Russian hydrocarbons.
Hungary’s focus has also been targeted to address supply security and price issues
by leveraging domestic sources of energy, which includes the exploitation of lignite,
oil, and natural gas, as well as continuing domestic nuclear power-based electricity
generation. The need to sustain domestic fossil fuel production has been a key point of
discourse emphasized by government officials and the upstream industry at large.
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However, lignite deposits are of weak quality and hydrocarbon reserves are rapidly
being depleted by producers, leaving the future of these energy sources in question.
Moreover, they may enhance supply security and energy autonomy, but their produc-
tion is not economically competitive. Nuclear power, however, continues to be a staple
of Hungary’s energy and broader political discourse, given its intimate linkages to the
country’s foreign policy towards Russia. The government and state-owned firms (e.g.,
MVM) have continuously emphasized the need for Paks to be expanded, since the
current reactors will have to be retired in the 2030s and are a key source of domes-
tically produced energy. Surveys show that 61% of society is generally against the
construction of an additional Russian-financed nuclear power station (Greenpeace
Hungary 2018). Fidesz supporters have been slightly in favor of the project, which has
also fused with their positive perception of Russia (Hargitai 2018; Magyari 2018). The
populace favors renewables over nuclear, which are seen as tools to mitigating
exposure to Russian influence, thereby enhancing energy security.
Climate change has only become a recent addition to prominent energy discourses
in Hungary. There had been a wave of focus on renewable energy in the early-2000s
that led to the expansion of wind generation capacities, but this came to an abrupt halt,
when the government decided to suspend support for wind and essentially ban the
technology. The founding of Hungary’s green party, Politics Can Be Different (LMP),
in 2009 provided some impetus for a more environmentally conscious dialogue in the
Parliament and in wider society. Meanwhile, Hungarian media’s reporting of the
Energiewende and the potential of renewables remained subdued (Antal and
Karhunmaa 2018). Integration into the European Union (Kerényi and Szabó 2006),
the Paris Agreement, and the European Commission’s (2016) introduction of the
Clean Energy Package began to shift the prominence of environmental and climate
discourse. However, this only rose in prominence in 2019, when the Fidesz-led
government lost key cities in municipal elections, where climate and environmental
action was an important factor that mobilized voters. Fidesz went from snubbing EU
2050 climate goals, to a proponent of climate action (Jávor 2020). Carbon lock-ins still
dominate the climate discourse, since the government has continuously emphasized
the need for prudent action in phasing out emitting sources of energy and underscoring
that nuclear is a carbon-neutral technology – thus, Hungary should support Paks II on
climate grounds as well – but as the costs of renewables decline their potential is
increasingly incorporated into societal discourses and future planning.
Coordination of the Instruments and Issues of Energy Transitions
Within a Multilevel Context
Drivers of Energy Transition
Energy security and pressure fromWestern institutions to enact change are the prime
drivers of Hungary’s energy transition. The former has been a continuous concern
for the country with governments, the private sector, and society seeking to ensure
the accessibility and affordability of imported energy, since domestic fossil fuel
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resources are insufficient to meet demand. In principle, an energy transition provides
an opportunity for Hungary to reduce its import reliance and meet its energy needs
through domestic production. This should entail a shift away from imported fossil
fuels towards domestically sourced energy, primarily via renewables. Domestically
produced renewable-based electricity offers an opportunity to reduce the import-
reliance of the country – approximately one third of demand (see section “Compo-
sition of the Energy Mix”). The forthcoming need to retire the Mátra Power Plant
further pressures the government to take action and deploy renewables to avoid a
hike in import reliance. The state has also accepted nuclear as a source of domestic
energy that maintains supply security reliant on low-carbon technologies. These
ambitions generally impede an energy transition (Antal 2019), but the government
has been adamant as framing the project as an integral part of a transition to a
low-carbon energy system, despite Paks’ and Paks II’s reliance on foreign technol-
ogy and source-fuel. Energy security is thus a driver of Hungary’s energy transition
to renewables, but renewable penetration is impeded by nuclear which the govern-
ment has also supported on inter alia energy security grounds.
A strong push of EU climate goals and obligations as well as the rising compet-
itiveness of renewables have complemented energy security considerations driving
Hungary’s energy transition. The European Union has been a self-proclaimed leader
in climate action, which has led the European Commission to set binding goals (e.g.,
renewable deployment targets) and introducing mechanisms (e.g., EU ETS) to
decarbonize its economy (Maltby 2013). The European Commission (2008, 2011,
2014) pushed for an energy transition in its 2020, 2030, and 2050 goals, which
Western European countries came to support (Sattich 2018). Hungary, like most
European countries, took little action prior to the 2010s, apart from a wave of
investment in wind power generation between 2000 and 2010, leading to the
325 MWof capacity still online (MAVIR 2019). Many Western European countries
accelerated their energy transitions in the early-2010s, but initially this had little
influence on Hungarian policy-makers. Fossil fuel and nuclear lock-ins sustained.
Simultaneously, the government was able to claim that it was en route to meeting
emission targets, since its targets were unambitious (see section “Strategies and
Instruments of Energy Transition”). The composition of the energy mix saw little
change, apart from an abrupt rise in the share of biomass (see section “Strategies and
Instruments of Energy Transition”) – a result of a shift in statistical accounting as
opposed to substantial change (Hvg.hu 2017). Drivers of the energy transition
remained insufficient to effectuate any substantial change in Hungary until the
mid-2010s, but allowed the country to move towards its 2020 EU targets. The
forthcoming decade through 2030 is what seems to pose a much greater challenge
and induce wide-ranging change.
The acceleration of Western Europe’s energy transition increasingly pressured
Central and Eastern Europe’s EU members to take action (Szabo and Deak 2020).
Lock-ins of energy consumption patterns sustained and renewables could not yet
challenge the price of fossil fuels. The government-supported lock-in of nuclear
technology also formed an impediment to the diffusion of renewables, as policy-
makers’ ambitions to construct Paks II overshadowed most other energy policy
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objectives in Hungary (Antal 2019). However, it has become clear that Hungary has
to facilitate the diffusion of renewables, its technology of choice is solar PV, to meet
2020 and 2030 EU targets. To facilitate the transition, the Commission has applied
carrot and stick approach to push EU member states to meet obligations, by
providing some funding for renewables and increasing energy efficiency. This has
been a lure that has driven Hungary’s energy transition. Simultaneously, the EU ETS
penalizes the consumption of high emission fuels and has recently become a policy
vehicle with teeth, as allowance prices rose to the EUR 20–25 band (see section
“Composition of the Energy Mix”). In the short term, energy companies have had to
rely on imports, but these factors can lead investment into renewables. The Com-
mission’s other stick is the measures it can take against member states who do not
meet renewable energy targets they set for 2020 and 2030. If and how the Commis-
sion will take action in these cases is unclear for now.
The political imposition of renewable penetration by EU-level institutions is
complemented by the rising competitiveness of renewables. Technological advance-
ments and economies of scale have led wind turbines and solar photovoltaics to
become competitive with their fossil fuel counterparts (Lazard 2018). Hungary also
has a generally favorable setting that allows producers to harness wind and solar
energy and relatively high utilization rates (Pálfy 2017). This, paired with the urgent
need to invest in domestic electricity generation capacities given the forecasted gap
in demand and supply, has led investors to show heightened interest in the Hungarian
market (MAVIR 2018). The government has also provided ample support for the
diffusion of renewables (see section “Strategies and Instruments of Energy Transi-
tion”). As the relative competitiveness of solar PV continues to rapidly increase,
market forces are taking over political obligations in driving the energy transitions.
Projects may still rely on some state support, but developers expect that the market
will move away from this reliance and solar PV will gradually outcompete other
modes of electricity generation, provided that a favorable environment (both legal-
regulatory and socio-technical) is maintained. Enmeshed in these drivers is a sliver
of industrial policy that began to adapt the Hungarian economy for a decarbonized
world, by backing lithium-ion battery, solar PV, and electric bus production. Overall,
drivers for Hungary’s energy transition are thus political and primarily externally
imposed, with some impetus provided by energy security considerations.
Strategies and Instruments of Energy Transition
Hungary’s energy transition strategy has relied on it being embedded in the EU’s
climate and energy governance structures. This sets some targets and the broad
framework, within which the country can navigate and develop its strategies to meet
its goals. The EU imposed a legally binding obligation on Hungary to include a 13%
minimum share of renewables in gross final energy consumption by 2020, while the
government set an even more ambitious target of 14.65% (European Parliament and
Council 2009b; NFM 2010). Subsequently, Hungary adopted a 21% target for 2030
(ITM 2020c). Due to a 2017 change in the EU’s accounting methodology of
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biomass, it seemed that Hungary would swiftly meet its 2020 renewable targets, with
renewables’ relative share climbing to a peak of 16.2% in 2013, heavily predicated
on biomass (Fig. 1). However, despite this boost, the relative role of renewables has
been going downhill since then. The temporary optimism has deferred focus on the
diffusion of nonbiomass renewables and may have hindered an even quicker
deployment of solar PV (HVG 2017). The government recently reversed this course
of action, heavily promoting the diffusion of solar PV to enable the country in
meeting 2020 EU targets (ITM 2020a, c).
The heating and cooling sector will continue to be responsible for highest share of
the renewable consumption, where the share of renewables may increase from
18.1% in 2018 to 28.7% in 2030 (Table 1) (ITM 2020a, c; MEKH 2020h). The
NECP aims to decrease gas consumption and the role of gas both in residential
individual household- and in district heating by the combination of energy efficiency
measures and fuel mix diversification. However, according to the NECP, Hungary
will also reduce residential firewood use. The NECP supports further heat pump
installations and efficient biomass-heating solutions. The role of gas is set to be
substituted in district heating through the introduction of more renewables, such as
biomass and geothermal energy. In addition, the NECP places emphasis on recov-
ering energy from nonrecyclable waste and the use of biogas from sewage, landfills,
and agricultural waste materials for district heating. The NECP states that the
replacement of natural gas-based district heating with renewable-based heat produc-
tion will not be carried out on a market basis; rather, it requires substantial invest-
ment support through instruments such as the Green District Heating Program (ITM
2020c). Therefore, in the 2014–2020 programming period, investment is provided
for the construction of renewable-based heat generation, which may facilitate sig-
nificant growth in biomass-based and geothermal energy.
The low-carbon electricity sector envisioned in the NECP will continue to be
based mainly on nuclear energy, partly preserving the old model with baseload
power and a centralized structure provided by a large and inflexible power plant,
but complemented with renewables. The role of renewables in gross electricity
consumption will increase from 8.3% in 2018 to 21.3% in 2030 and 29.3% in
2040 per the so-called WAM (“with additional measures”) scenario, reflecting
additional measures to be taken, as compared to the WEM (“with existing mea-
sures”) scenario (Fig. 1) (ITM 2020a; MEKH 2020h). On the generation side in the
WAM scenario, the share of renewables is projected to grow from 11.6% in 2018 to
19.7% in 2030 and 44.1% in 2040. The combined share of renewables and nuclear in
the electricity mix is planned to be 78.6% in 2030 and 90.7% in 2040 from 60.8% in
2018 (Fig. 2) (ITM 2020a; MEKH 2020a). The four Soviet-designed units (500 MW
each) at the Paks power station in operation will be phased out in the 2030s, after the
end of their 20-year lifetime extension program. Although uncertainties are large, the
two new units are planned to be commissioned until 2030, with a slightly higher
combined capacity (two units of 1200 MW each) than that of the four old units.
Therefore, the share of nuclear power will surge by 2030 and then decline. In 2030,
Hungary plans to be almost self-sufficient in electricity on a yearly basis (ITM
2020c).
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The government’s centralized and nuclear-centric approach to the energy transi-
tion in inter alia the NECP reflects its skepticism towards the reliability of intermit-
tent renewables, weighing on their expansion. However, external, mainly EU,
pressure and the rising competitiveness of solar PV have changed this situation.
The government has chosen solar PV as the renewable of the future, providing it
ample backwind. According to the NECP’s WAM scenario, the technology’s share in
output will increase from 1.9% in 2018 to 3.9% in 2020, 11.5% in 2030, and 29.3%
in 2040 (Fig. 2) (ITM 2020a; MEKH 2020a). The anticipated rapid spread of solar
PVacross Hungary will strengthen decentralized energy system structures. Biomass
can also continue to expand and may provide an easy way to increase the role of
renewables in electricity. On the other hand, the Hungarian government does not
intend to exploit the remaining wind potential. It introduced a de facto ban on new
wind power plant projects in 2016, with no new permits issued since 2006. There are
multiple theories as to why this executive decision was taken, a plausible one of
which is that the technology was overly linked to the Socialist government’s
scandalous distribution of construction quotas in 2006 – an act that the Fidesz
government had looked to distance itself from (Weiner 2019). We also see this ban
linked to the government’s energy policy priorities that focused on Paks II. Lastly,
hydro potential is also not likely to be utilized (ITM 2020a).
The government has driven renewable electricity generation through various
support schemes. The first of these was KÁP in place between 2003 and 2007,
followed by the KÁT between 2008 and 2016. The third generation of support
schemes (METÁR) was launched in 2017 (Haffner 2018). Not only does METÁR
provide operating aid for electricity generation, but it also facilitates market integra-
tion of renewable energy production. According to the original plans, power plants
with a capacity of less than 0.5 MW or pilot technologies and projects were to be
eligible for support (METÁR-KÁT), while METÁR’s green premium was to be
granted without a tender for installations with a capacity of between 0.5 MW and
1 MW, and through a tender for facilities with a capacity of at least 1 MW.
Ultimately, projects with a capacity of under 0.5 MW were also included in the
premium scheme, and the fixed-rate feed-in tariff option ceased to exist. In addition
to supporting the building of new units, the METÁR system also supports the
preservation of existing renewable energy capacities through METÁR’s brown
premium system. Hungary will distribute a maximum annual amount of HUF
45 billion (EUR 130 million) within the framework of METÁR through 2026
(ITM 2020c).
The maturity of solar PV technology and the safe investment it provided pro-
mpted developers to submit over 1 GWof project proposals before the KÁT system
was set to expire at the end of 2016 (Kulcsár 2019). Developers are still realizing
projects from this wave of proposals, which have contributed to total solar PV
capacities increasing to 1144 MW in mid-2019 from 321 MW at the end of 2017
(MEKH 2019a). Subsequently, the government waited until 2019 to launch a tender
under the METÁR scheme, as its foot-dragging to introduce further change con-
tinues. Nonetheless, investors still see Hungary’s geography as favorable for solar
PV, but issues such as grid connection and instability in the regulatory environment
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weigh on the diffusion of the technology as the government continues to hesitate to
take action that would accelerate the energy transition. Hungary also encourages the
installation of solar PV systems, partially replacing household electricity consump-
tion drawn from the grid. There is an interest-free energy-efficiency loan in the
Hungarian market that has been offered to households since 2017, but the Hungarian
regulation on the energy characteristics of buildings is the one which is expected to
drive further exponential growth of production units currently defined as small-scale
household power plants, since it requires that at least 25% of the energy needs of new
public and residential buildings should be covered by renewables post-2018 and
post-2020, respectively. The 2030 target of the NECP is to have at least 200,000
households with roof-mounted solar panels averaging 4 kWeach from 29,593 small-
scale household solar PV power plants at end-2017 (ITM 2020c; MEKH 2019b).
Despite strategies to expand renewable-based power generation, nuclear, natural
gas, and coal still dominate the country’s domestic electricity scene. Lignite still
enjoys a solid position in Hungary, but its NECP established 2030 as the year for
achieving a lignite-free power sector (ITM 2020c). Since then, the respective
minister has fast-tracked this objective to 2025 (Marczisovszky 2020). Internalizing
instruments are strongly affecting the future of the lignite-fired Mátra Power Plant
which buys 100% of its CO2 quotas (Mert.hu n.d.). The power plant’s profitability
thus depends primarily on electricity and carbon prices, and consequently under the
current market conditions, it is a loss-making operation. The NECP expects the role
of gas in electricity generation will increase until significant PV capacity enters the
grid and Paks II starts operating (ITM 2020a). However, after that time, gas-based
generation will decrease both in absolute and relative terms, but gas will continue to
play an important role in electricity generation as a flexible peaking resource or a
standby reserve in the electricity system.
Growth in renewable energy consumption in the transport sector has primarily
been attributable to the use of biodiesel produced from first generation (food and
feed crops-based) biofuels and used cooking oil. In 2020, the government increased
the mandatory blending ratio to 8.2% of biofuels, driving a 6.1% blending percent-
age of bioethanol in gasoline (ITM 2020c). Despite some action, Hungary is unlikely
to meet its relevant 2020 EU target requiring a 10% share of renewables in the
transport sector by 2020, which stood at 7.7% in 2018 (Fig. 1) (MEKH 2020h; ITM
2020a). According to the NECP’s WAM scenario, the share of energy from renew-
able sources used for transport could increase to 16.9% in 2030 and 28.8% in 2040
(Fig. 2) (ITM 2020a), compared to the minimum binding target of 14% in 2030
(European Parliament and Council 2018a). In order to achieve at least the latter goal,
the government plans to raise the proportion of first-generation biofuels to nearly
7%, while the share of second generation biofuels and biogas should be raised to
3.5%. The remainder will hinge on transportation’s electrification. Hungary supports
the spread of electric vehicles with financial instruments, including direct subsidies
for individuals seeking to purchase these vehicles and tax breaks. It is also
implementing programs that encourage the spread of electromobility through the
development of charging infrastructure. Moreover, the country is also expected to
put nearly 1300 environmentally friendly buses into operation by 2029 through the
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Green Bus Program. In addition to public transport, natural gas and biogas can play a
greater role in freight transport (ITM 2020c).
Hungary has taken on modest energy efficiency targets in comparison to the EU’s
overall goals, but even so, it may face difficulties in meeting its 2030 final energy
consumption target. Primary and final energy consumption reached 1025 PJ and 776
PJ in 2018 (MEKH 2020f), respectively, with 2020 targets of 1009 PJ and 693 PJ
(Government Decree 1160/2015 [III. 20.]). Residential final energy consumption
was 244 PJ in 2018 (MEKH 2020f), despite the government’s former goal set at 207
PJ for 2020 (NFM 2015, 18). Hungary is far from this goal. Meanwhile, the
government aims to keep Hungary’s final energy consumption below 2005 levels
in 2030 (Government Decree 1772/2018 [XII. 21.]). This represents a modest
commitment in light of the fact that the EU decided to reduce final energy consump-
tion by 20% compared to the 2005 levels (European Parliament and Council 2018b).
In its WEM scenario, the NECP assumes an 18.7% increase in the final energy
consumption between 2015 and 2030. And even if the WAM scenario materializes,
final energy consumption will still increase by 7.6% in this period. There is only a
9.4% difference between the 2030 final energy consumption data based on WEM
and WAM. In contrast, the NECP expects final household energy consumption to
decrease by either 0.8% or 31.7% depending on existing or additional policy
measures (ITM 2020a), indicating that Hungary’s total final energy consumption
target depends on the exploitation of the residential energy savings potential, which,
however, would require further proactive intervention (Table 3).
Hungary has to take vastly larger efforts to increase energy efficiency and
renewable penetration rates in comparison to meeting its GHG targets. The NECP
suggests that with existing measures GHG emissions would rise to 62.8 MtCO2q by
2030, beyond the 40% reduction in emissions compared to 1990 level Hungary has
committed to. With additional measures, Hungary will be able to reduce them to 56.2
MtCO22q by 2030, slightly below its target of 56.3 MtCO2q. Since the Mátra Power
Plant is responsible for around six million tons of annual CO2 emissions (Napi.hu.
2016), the majority of the target can be met by eliminating lignite use. While GHG
emissions under the ETS must fall significantly, the situation is much better in
sectors outside the ETS. As part of the EU’s 2009 Effort Sharing Decision, Hungary
can increase its emissions by 10% between 2013 and 2020, relative to 2005
emissions levels (European Parliament and Council 2009a). It is unlikely to do
so. In contrast, as part of the 2018 Effort Sharing Regulation, emissions for sectors
outside the ETS should be reduced in Hungary by 7% between 2021 and 2030, in
relation to its 2005 levels (European Parliament and Council 2018c), ushering a
disruptive force into Hungary’s energy system.
Coordination Mechanisms and Multilevel Governance
Hungary’s energy governance features a horizontally fragmented and vertically
integrated decision-making system that heavily relies on the goals and ambitions
of PM Orbán, although shaped by the historical legacies of the country and its
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dialogue with the EU. Coordination mechanisms, including strategy design, are
shaped by the dialogue between the Prime Minister’s office, as well as decision-
makers in the EU and Russia. The Hungarian government has continuously engaged
with EU policy-makers in an attempt to lower climate action-related targets. This has
become especially evident in European Council meetings, where the country was
continuously seen as a laggard and one that sought to obstruct the acceptance of
targets, primarily since it sought to ensure that the EU provides it with ample funding
to finance its transition. On the other hand, Hungary has maintained strong ties to
Russia, which are heavily based on its energy system. The government’s continued
goal to ensure access to ample natural gas supplies at favorable prices and its bid to
construct Paks II were coordinated at the highest levels of government with essen-
tially no input from other actors.
Coordination in Hungary’s energy scene primarily takes place between the
highest levels of government, from where implementation is managed through a
top-down approach. Various branches of the ministry possess competences over
decision-making, but their positions are subjugated to the goals of the PM’s office, as
is the role of MEKH. The increasing state ownership of energy firms has also limited
their ability to challenge government policy, instead, taking orders or shaping policy
in close coordination with political decision-makers. Lastly, the Orbán regime has
systematically sought to curtail the voices of NGOs, limiting their ability to become
involved in energy governance as well. Meanwhile, a portion of the populace may be
developing into prosumers over the past few years, but this has only had a minor
impact on the overall landscape of energy governance.
Outcomes, Challenges, and Prospects of Energy Governance
This chapter has shown that the future of Hungary’s energy governance relies on two
basic factors: the Orbán regime’s objectives and the broader energy trends impacting
CEE countries. The objectives of PM Orbán’s regime-building have clearly materi-
alized. Fidesz governments have fortified the current setup since 2010, where
governance-design reflects objectives of subduing prices, maintaining national own-
ership and pervasive institutional fragmentation, as well as hands-on control from
the highest echelons of politics – all of which have become key descriptors of the
country’s illiberal energy governance regime. These objectives have been nested in
the broader setting of a Russian energy dependent CEE country, where the lock-ins
of existing consumption patterns are extremely powerful as is the disruption exe-
cuted by the EU. Regional market, technology, and industrial developments, as well
as international security considerations are set to continue to shape energy policies.
Even if Hungarian political and policy designs are not fully congruent with those of
its neighbors, we postulate that limitations posed by national self-rule will continue
to be a basic policy benchmark. These two sets of factors provide an overarching
framework, within which Hungary’s energy system has shown some flexibility and
adaptability, primarily in response to external pressure from the European Union.
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Hungary’s low-carbon energy transition is particularly interesting and challeng-
ing, since the country will implement this in a unique, in some regards, archaic
policy setup. Its policy objectives frequently contradict one another, but leave space
for a high number of variegated configurations. Hungarian energy policy should
keep household prices low in a time when price intensity of energy and its networks
have been on the rise. It also needs to limit price hikes for industrial consumers to
maintain economic competitiveness, while raising domestic investments from cur-
rent untenably low levels. Energy policy shall simultaneously maintain the govern-
ment’s control over the sector, capture its rents, while forging new coalitions with
emerging constituencies, companies, and institutions of the ongoing energy transi-
tion. It also has to transform the country’s industrial policy, shifting its heavy
reliance on combustion car manufacturing to meet the demands of e-mobility,
while its capabilities as a high-value added host country have been fading away. In
meeting these contradicting goals, key actors of Hungarian energy governance will
have to carefully maneuver between its legacies that closely link it to Russia and the
commitments the country has taken on by joining the EU, without surrendering the
government’s bid to enhance energy security.
Investment into electricity infrastructure (including power generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution) plummeted in recent years, which stands in sharp contrast
with the need for investment into the sector to meet demand and increase self-
sufficiency per the government’s rhetoric. Where will the investments come from?
Meanwhile, projects launched reflect the Orbán government’s preference towards
equity subsidization through budgetary means from taxpayers’ money, as is the case
with the Paks II nuclear deal and solar capacity expansion. The former is entirely
financed from the central budget without being reflected in consumer prices during
its construction. The government’s solar power expansion goal has to be met amid
tight-fisted subsidies reliant on government support and EU funds. Other segments,
like gas power plants and transmission networks, almost exclusively belong to
domestic private- and state-owned companies, opening up the way for extensive
bargaining with the government. This unfolds as actors understand the prospects of
the sector, including the urgent need to expand their capacities and alter their
business models to an age with high capacity demand but low utilization rates.
The prospects of Hungary’s energy transition rely on its ability and willingness to
overcome historical lock-ins. The Paks II case is particularly relevant in this regard.
Opponents criticize the project, characterizing it as an old-fashioned, expensive
investment, providing incremental exposure to Russian influence, and opening up
excessive corruption opportunities through state financing. Undeniably, the govern-
ment decision to develop the project can be described as a classic case of sectoral
lock-in, when not only the choice of fuel, but also the decision-making process and
major characteristics of the deal reflect the previous agreement from the 1970s. Paks
II can be a major barrier to energy transition, since it saps the government’s attention
and resources away from renewables, capping their expansion. Even though the two
sources of energy could work alongside one-another: nuclear providing baseload
electricity generation and renewables an intermittent source of electricity. Moreover,
the government’s narrative suggests that nuclear is a low-carbon technology, which
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will provide cheap energy – pending the operating company will not repay capital
costs – and contributing to low utility prices. From this angle, maintaining the
current nuclear capacity beyond 2040 is an indispensable step to successful energy
transition. On the other hand, potential delays of the project, high capital expendi-
ture, sustainment of path dependencies, and its inhibition of renewable diffusion
despite their plummeting costs all hinder Hungary’s move to renewables. Nonethe-
less, Paks II continues to be at the heart of the government’s energy policy agenda,
shaping the prospects of the energy sector, while overriding essentially all other
considerations.
After having extensively relied on biomass, solar PV has become the Hungarian
government’s main tool to meet EU-imposed climate targets and enhance energy
security. In doing so, however, it has disrupted the energy system, corroding lock-
ins, and shaping future energy prospects. The competitiveness of the technology
would allow for a thriving market, but its full potential remains to be realized. State
plans and strategies show growing support for solar PV, but simultaneously repre-
sentatives urge caution and a moderate pace, to avoid the rapid disruption of energy
producer-consumer relations. The scaling-up of solar PV would primarily impact
electricity imports and substitute the lignite-based Mátra Power Plant’s generation –
the latter of which has to be retired in forthcoming years. This substitution would
only have a moderate impact on the country’s energy security, leaving the hydro-
carbon and nuclear-based Russia-centric geopolitical relations of Hungary in-tact for
the foreseeable future. It is set to continue to rely on imported natural gas and oil for
heating and industrial consumption as well as transportation, respectively. Biofuels
and electric vehicles have been playing an increasing but still moderate role in the
transportation sector, leaving their diffusion to be a task of the future. Meanwhile,
district heating based on the rising consumption of biomass and the utilization of the
country’s geothermal potential remains untapped. As the government proposes its
EU-mandated climate and energy plans, observers can attain a rough understanding
of the country’s planned trajectory. Specifics may be lacking, but it seems clear that
the transition will be moderately paced and centrally controlled.
Hungarian energy governance conveys a unique disposition, filled with contra-
dictions and lacking clarity. Much like many of its CEE neighbors, it is still
entrenched in preexisting producer-consumer relations that shape its amicable rela-
tions with Russia. This, like most of the country’s energy policy, is shaped at the
highest political level. Multilevel governance is subordinated to anticipate or execute
the objectives dictated by policy-makers in the highest echelons of government.
Other actors have very limited powers to question, contradict, or substantially shape
the government objectives. Power and control over public and private entities is
concentrated in the hands of a few, who have continuously undertaken a balancing
act between the forces and requirements posed by the EU upon Hungary and the
relations that tie it to Russia. Solar PV has had some, but still limited impact on the
country’s energy scene. It decarbonizes the energy system, but carries limited
ramifications in shaping the governance structures of the country, while continuing
to exist in the shadow of nuclear power. In the nonelectricity sectors, natural gas
continues to be dominant, entrenched by infrastructural path dependencies and
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through its role as the backbone of Hungary-Russia relations. Oil takes on a similar
role as well. The real challenges in the Hungarian energy sector are set to increase as
we move closer to 2030 and 2050 EU decarbonization and renewable energy targets,
but it remains unclear how Hungary will enact the radical change necessary to meet
these goals.
Cross-References
▶Energy Governance in Austria
▶Energy Governance in Croatia
▶Energy Governance in Russia: From a Fossil to a Green Giant?
▶European Union Energy Policy: A Discourse Perspective
▶EU-Russia Energy Relations
▶Transition of Energy Systems: Patterns of Stability and Change
Acknowledgments Csaba Weiner’s research was supported by the János Bolyai Research Schol-
arship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. We would like to thank the editors, Jörg Kemmerzell
and Michèle Knodt, for their work on the volume, as well as Áron Buzogány for his helpful
comments on this chapter.
References
Antal, M. (2019). How the regime hampered a transition to renewable electricity in Hungary.
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 33, 162–182. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
eist.2019.04.004.
Antal, M., & Karhunmaa, K. (2018). The German energy transition in the British, Finnish and
Hungarian news media. Nature Energy, 3(11), 994–1001. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-018-
0248-3.
Báger, G., & Kovács, Á. (2004). Privatizáció Magyarországon I. kötet [Privatisation in Hungary,
Vol. I]. Budapest: Állami Számvevőszék. https://www.asz.hu/storage/files/files/Publikaciok/
Archiv_tanulmanyok/privatizacio.pdf?download¼true. Accessed 5 Mar 2020.
Benczes, I. (2016). From goulash communism to goulash populism: The unwanted legacy of
Hungarian reform socialism. Post-Communist Economies, 28(2), 146–166. https://doi.org/
10.1080/14631377.2015.1124557.
Böcskei, B. (2015). Rezsicsökkentés: a közpolitikai változás mint politikai innováció [Utility price
reduction: Public policy change as political innovation]. Politikatudományi Szemle, 24(4), 94–
114. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id¼366236. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
Bouzarovski, S., Herrero, S. T., Petrova, S., & Ürge-Vorsatz, D. (2016). Unpacking the spaces and
politics of energy poverty: Path-dependencies, deprivation and fuel switching in post-
communist Hungary. Local Environment, 21(9), 1151–1170. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13549839.2015.1075480.
BP. (2019a). Statistical review of world energy – All data, 1965–2017. BP – Definitions and
explanatory notes. https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-
review-of-world-energy.html. Accessed 2 Apr 2019.
BP. (2019b). BP statistical review of world energy 2019. https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/
business-sites/en/global/corporate/xlsx/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-
2019-all-data.xlsx. Accessed 4 Oct 2019.
Energy Governance in Hungary 27
EASAC (European Academies’ Science Advisory Council). (2019). Leading scientists warn: Wood
pellets threat to climate: “No silver pellet”. European. https://www.ria.ie/news/policy-and-
international-relations-international-activities/leading-scientists-warn-wood. Accessed 14 Feb
2020.
European Commission. (2008). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
20 20 by 2020 – Europe’s climate change opportunity. COM(2008) 30 final. https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX:52008DC0030. Accessed 7 Aug 2019.
European Commission. (2011). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050. COM(2011) 112 final.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX:52011DC0112. Accessed 21 Nov
2017.
European Commission. (2014). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030. COM(2014) 15
final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX:52014DC0015. Accessed
11 Feb 2020.
European Commission. (2016). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and
the European Investment Bank: Clean energy for all Europeans. COM(2016) 860 final. https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri¼cellar:fa6ea15b-b7b0-11e6-9e3c-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/
DOC_1&format¼PDF. Accessed 17 Aug 2018.
European Parliament and Council. (2009a). Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX%3A32009D0406. Accessed 9
Dec 2019.
European Parliament and Council. (2009b). Consolidated text: Directive 2009/28/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/
30/EC (Text with EEA relevance). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri¼CELEX:02009L0028-20151005. Accessed 29 Mar 2020.
European Parliament and Council. (2010). Consolidated text: Directive 2010/31/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 19May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings
(recast). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼CELEX:02010L0031-
20181224. Accessed 29 Mar 2020.
European Parliament and Council. (2018a). Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable
sources (Text with EEA relevance). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri¼CELEX:32018L2001. Accessed 9 Dec 2019.
European Parliament and Council. (2018b). Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency
(Text with EEA relevance). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri¼CELEX:32018L2002&from¼EN. Accessed 9 Dec 2019.
European Parliament and Council. (2018c). Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by
Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the
Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 (Text with EEA relevance).
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri¼celex:32018R0842. Accessed 9 Dec
2019.
Eurostat. (2018a). Supply, transformation and consumption of electricity: Annual data [nrg_105a].
(Last update: 04-06-2018). http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset¼nrg_
105a&lang¼en. Accessed 30 Oct 2018. (This link does not exist anymore.)
28 J. Szabo et al.
Eurostat. (2018b). Supply, transformation and consumption of heat: Annual data [nrg_106a]. (Last
update: 04-06-2018). http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset¼nrg_106a&
lang¼en. Accessed 30 Oct 2018. (This link does not exist anymore.)
Eurostat. (2020a). Complete energy balances [nrg_bal_c]. (Last update: 13-01-2020). https://
appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset¼nrg_bal_c&lang¼en. Accessed 5 Feb 2020.
Eurostat. (2020b). Gross capital formation by industry [NACE A*64]. (Last update: 31-01-2020).
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. Accessed 5 Feb 2020.
Eurostat. (2020c). Supply, transformation and consumption of electricity [nrg_cb_e]. (Last update:
31-01-2020). https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset¼nrg_cb_e&lang¼en.
Accessed 5 Feb 2020.
Filippov, G. (2018, 31 July). A hibrid ellenforradalom kora [The age of the hybrid counterrevolu-
tion]. 24.hu. https://24.hu/belfold/2018/07/31/filippov-gabor-a-hibrid-ellenforradalom-kora/.
Accessed 28 Feb 2020.
Government Decree 1160/2015 (III. 20.). http://www.kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/
MK15036.pdf. Accessed 20 Dec 2019.
Government Decree 277/2016 (IX. 15.). https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid¼A1600277.KOR&
timeshift¼20160923&txtreferer¼00000001.txt. Accessed 31 Mar 2019.
Government Decree 1772/2018 (XII. 21.). https://magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/
dd82ad295f630940ab7308cb468a715d71acb540/letoltes. Accessed 20 Dec 2019.
Government Regulation 279/2017 (IX. 22.). https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid¼A1700279.KOR.
Accessed 31 Mar 2019.
Greenpeace Hungary. (2018, 19 January). A magyarok túlnyomó többsége ellenzi Paks II-t, főként a
projekt veszélyessége miatt [The majority of Hungarians oppose Paks II, mainly because of the
project’s dangers]. https://www.greenpeace.org/hungary/sajtokozlemeny/2317/a-magyarok-
tulnyomo-tobbsege-ellenzi-paks-ii-t-fokent-a-projekt-veszelyessege-miatt/. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
Haffner, T. (2018). A megújuló energia termelés támogatásának intézményi változásai – a Megújuló
Energia Támogatási Rendszer bevezetése [Institutional changes in support of renewable energy
production: Introduction of renewable energy support scheme]. Közép-Európai Közlemények,
11(2), 17–29. http://vikek.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/KEKNo412018.2.sz%C3%A1m.
pdf#page¼17. Accessed 19 Nov 2018.
Hargitai, M. (2018, 23 July). Hatástalan a propaganda: nem akarjuk Paks 2-t [Ineffective propa-
ganda: We do not want Paks 2]. Népszava. https://nepszava.hu/3002452_hatastalan-a-propa
ganda-nem-akarjuk-paks-2-t. Accessed 15 Feb 2020.
Hoffman, G. W., & Dienes, L. (1985). The European energy challenge: East and west. Durham:
Duke University Press. https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/21773416. Accessed 27 Jun 2019.
Horváth, M. T. (2016). A fáraó varázsol. A rezsicsökkentés beágyazottsága [The magic of the
pharaoh: The embeddedness of the utility price reductions]. Politikatudományi Szemle, 25(3),
135–146. http://real-j.mtak.hu/6520/26/Nyomdai%20Poltud_Szemle_2016-03%20bel%C3%
ADv.pdf. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
Hvg.hu. (2017, 3 April). Energia: zöldebbek lettünk, de ez nem sok jót jelent [Energy: We have
become greener, but this does not mean much good]. https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20170403_
Energia_zoldebbek_lettunk_de_ez_nem_sok_jot_jelent. Accessed 11 Feb 2020.
ITM. (2019). Az innovációért és technológiáért felelős miniszter 4/2019. (II. 28.) ITM utasítása az
Innovációs és Technológiai Minisztérium Szervezeti és Működési Szabályzatáról [The Ministry
of Innovation and Technology’s decree on its organisational and operational rules]. https://www.
kormany.hu/download/8/02/91000/Innov%C3%A1ci%C3%B3s%20%C3%A9s%20Technol%
C3%B3giai%20Miniszt%C3%A9rium%20Szervezeti%20%C3%A9s%20M%C5%B1k%C3%
B6d%C3%A9si%20Szab%C3%A1lyzata.pdf. Accessed 2 Mar 2020.
ITM. (2020a).Magyarország Nemzeti Energia- és Klímaterve – 2–3. melléklet [Hungary’s National
Energy and Climate Plan – Annexes 2–3]. Budapest: ITM. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?
source¼11&type¼402#!DocumentBrowse. Accessed 2 Feb 2020.
ITM. (2020b). Magyarország Nemzeti Energia- és Klímaterve – 4. melléklet [Hungary’s National
Energy and climate plan – Annex 4]. Budapest: ITM. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?
source¼11&type¼402#!DocumentBrowse. Accessed 2 Feb 2020.
Energy Governance in Hungary 29
ITM. (2020c). Magyarország Nemzeti Energia- és Klímaterve [Hungary’s National Energy and
Climate Plan]. Budapest: ITM. https://www.kormany.hu/hu/dok?source¼11&type¼402#!
DocumentBrowse. Accessed 2 Feb 2020.
ITM (Ministry for Innovation and Technology). (2018). National Energy and climate plan of Hungary
(draft). Budapest: Ministry for Innovation and Technology (ITM). https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/
ener/files/documents/ec_courtesy_translation_hu_necp.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2019.
Jávor, B. (2020, 15 January). Jávor Benedek: Új magyar klímapolitika – A fordulat éve? [Jávor
Benedek: New Hungarian climate politics, the year of the turn?].Mérce. https://merce.hu/2020/
01/15/javor-benedek-uj-magyar-klimapolitika-a-fordulat-eve/. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
KBM. (2008). A magyar bányászati termelés története [The history of Hungary’s mining]. Központi
Bányászati Múzeum (KBM). http://www.kbm.hu/hu/node/6. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
Kerényi, S., & Szabó, M. (2006). Transnational influences on patterns of mobilisation within
environmental movements in Hungary. Environmental Politics, 15(5), 803–820. https://doi.
org/10.1080/09644010600937249.
KKM. (2019). A külgazdasági és külügyminiszter 4/2019 (III. 13.) KKM utasítása a Külgazdasági
és Külügyminisztérium Szervezeti és Működési Szabályzatáról [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade’s directive on its organisational and operational rules]. https://www.kormany.hu/
download/d/64/91000/A%20K%C3%BClgazdas%C3%A1gi%20%C3%A9s%20K%C3%BCl
%C3%BCgyminiszt%C3%A9rium%20SZMSZ-e.pdf. Accessed 2 Mar 2020.
Kulcsár, B. (2019). Kötelezö átvételi rendszerben benyújtott naperőmű létesítési igények,
megválósúlásának hatása a magyarországi településá llomány villamosenergia ellátására [The
impact of realisation of solar power plant installation requests in Mandatory Purchase (KÁT)
system on the electricity supply of Hungarian settlements]. International Journal of Engineer-
ing and Management Sciences (IJEMS), 4(2), 54–60. https://doi.org/10.21791/IJEMS.2019.2.6.
KWK-Index. (n.d.). Quarterly prices according to CHP law. European Energy Exchange. https://
www.eex.com/en/market-data/power/power-indices/kwk-index. Accessed 16 Jan 2020.
Lazard. (2018). Levelized cost of energy and levelized cost of storage 2018. Insights, 8 November.
https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-and-levelized-cost-of-storage-
2018/. Accessed 13 Sept 2019.
Magyar, B. (Ed.) (2016). Post-communist mafia state: The case of Hungary. Budapest: CEU Press.
Magyari, P. (2018, 14 March). A fideszesek nagyon megszerették Putyint és Oroszországot [Fidesz
supporters have really come to love Putin and Russia]. 444. https://444.hu/2018/03/14/a-
fideszesek-nagyon-megszerettek-putyint-es-oroszorszagot. Accessed 15 Feb 2020.
Maltby, T. (2013). European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission
policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism. Energy Policy, 55, 435–444. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.12.031.
Marczisovszky, M. (2020, 19 February). Palkovics: 2025-től földgáz alapú lesz a Mátrai Erőmű
[Palkovics: The Mátra Power Plant will be natural gas-based beginning in 2025]. Index.hu.
https://index.hu/gazdasag/2020/02/19/matrai_eromu_palkovics_bejelentette_foldgaz_alapu/.
Accessed 19 Feb 2020.
MAVIR. (2018). A magyar villamosenergia-rendszer közép- és hosszú távú forrásoldali kapacitás-
fejlesztése [The Hungarian electricity system’s mid- and long-term supply side capacity expan-
sions]. Budapest: MAVIR. https://www.mavir.hu/documents/10258/15461/Forr%C3%
A1selemz%C3%A9s_2018_IG.pdf/fc043982-a8ea-e49f-6061-418b254a6391. Accessed
11 Feb 2020.
MAVIR. (2019). Data of the Hungarian electricity system, 2018. Budapest: MAVIR. http://mavir.
hu/documents/10258/45985073/MAVIR_VER_2018.pdf/292fd722-ec62-2826-6e8d-
1bcd6c86c49c. Accessed 11 Feb 2020.
MEHI. (2019, 7 February). 2017-ben immár harmadik éve nőtt az EU energiafogyasztása
[EU energy consumption increases in 2017 for the third year]. https://mehi.hu/hir/2017-ben-
immar-harmadik-eve-nott-az-eu-energiafogyasztasa. Accessed 7 July 2019.
MEKH (Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority). (2019a, 3 October). 1,1 GW
összteljesítményt értek el a napelemek 2019 közepére [Solar PVs have reached 1.1 GW total
generation by mid-2019]. http://www.mekh.hu/1-1-gw-osszteljesitmenyt-ertek-el-a-napelemek-
2019-kozepere. Accessed 11 Feb 2020.
30 J. Szabo et al.
MEKH. (2019b). Összefoglaló a nem engedélyköteles – ezen belül a háztartási méretű –
kiserőművek adatairól (2008–2017) [A summary about small power plants that do not have to
be permitted – including household sized installations]. http://www.mekh.hu/download/3/28/
60000/nem_engedelykoteles_es_hmke_beszamolo_2008_2017.xlsx. Accessed 10 Jan 2020.
MEKH. (2020a). Annual data on gross electricity production, 2014–2018. (Date of the last update:
in January 31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/4/c2/c0000/4_2_gross_electricity_produc
tion_2014_2018.xlsx. Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020b). Annual data on heat production, 2014–2018. (Date of the last update: in January
31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/5/c2/c0000/5_1_thermal_energy_production_2014_
2018.xlsx. Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020c). Annual natural gas balance 2014–2018. (Date of the last update: in January
31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/3/c2/c0000/3_2_annual_natural_gas_balance_
2014_2018.xlsx. Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020d). Annual supply of crude oil, other primary oil and secondary petroleum products
2014–2018. (Date of the last update: in January 31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/1/80/
c0000/2_2_annual_supply_of_petroleum_and_petroleum_products_annual_2018.xlsx. Accessed
22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020e). Final energy consumption of households, 2015–2018. (Date of the last update: in
January 31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/9/c2/c0000/8_1_annual_energy_consump
tion_of_households.xlsx. Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020f). National detailed energy balance – Eurostat format – (annual) 2014–2018. (Date
of the last update: in January 31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/e/b2/c0000/7_4_
orszagos_eves_%20Eurostat_%20tipusu_%20reszletes_%20energiamerleg_2014_2018.xlsx.
Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020g). Production and consumption of primary renewable energy sources, 2014–2018.
(Date of the last update: in January 31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/7/c2/c0000/6_2_
primary_renewable_en_sources_2014_2018.xlsx. Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
MEKH. (2020h). Share of renewable sources in gross final energy consumption, 2005–2018. (Date
of the last update: in January 31, 2020). http://www.mekh.hu/download/6/c2/c0000/6_1_share_
of_renewable_en_sources_2005_2018.xlsx. Accessed 22 Feb 2020.
Mert.hu. (n.d.). Mátrai Erőmű. Köszöntő [Mátra Power Plant: Greetings]. http://www.mert.hu/hu/
elnoki-koszonto. Accessed 9 Nov 2018.
Mihályi, P. (2018). A privatizált vagyon visszaállamosítása [The re-nationalisation of privatized
wealth]. Manuscript. Budapest: MTA KRTK. https://www.mtakti.hu/wp-content/uploads/2018/
04/10_Visszaallamositas_KTRK_eloadashoz.pdf. Accessed 15 Feb 2020.
Mocsáry, J. (2001). Visszapillantás a privatizációra [Taking a look back on privatisation]. Eszmélet, 49.
http://www.eszmelet.hu/mocsary_jozsef-visszapillantas-a-privatizaciora/. Accessed 27 Mar 2020.
Müller, J-W. (2014). Putinism, Orbanism. . . But is there an “ism”? IWM. https://www.iwm.at/
transit-online/putinism-orbanism-ism/. Accessed 28 Feb 2020.
Napi.hu. (2016, 7 July). Az EU legszennyezőbb szénerőművei között a Mátrai Erőmű [Mátra Power Plant
is one of the most polluting coal power plants in the EU]. https://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/az_
eu_legszennyezobb_szeneromuvei_kozott_a_matrai_eromu.617386.html. Accessed 4 May 2017.
NFM. (2015). Hungary’s National Energy Efficiency Action Plan until 2020. Budapest: NFM. https://ec.
europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/hungaryActionPlan2014_en.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2019.
NFM (Ministry of National Development). (2010). National renewable energy action plan 2010–
2020. Budapest: NFM. http://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/6/b9/30000/RENEWABLE%
20ENERGY_REPUBLIC%20OF%20HUNGARY%20NATIONAL%20RENEWABLE%
20ENERGY%20ACTION%20PLAN%202010_2020.pdf. Accessed 1 June 2019.
Orbán, V. (2014). A munkaalapú állam korszaka következik [The age of a work-based system is
next]. Tusnádfürdő: Speech at the XXV. Bálványosi Summer University and Student Camp.
https://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk/a-munkaalapu-
allam-korszaka-kovetkezik. Accessed 28 Feb 2020.
Pálfy, M. (2017). A napenergia fotovillamos hasznosítása [Solar power’s PV utilisation]. Magyar
Tudomány, 178(5), 532–539. http://epa.oszk.hu/00600/00691/00164/pdf/EPA00691_mtud_
2017_05_532-539.pdf. Accessed 11 Feb 2020.
Energy Governance in Hungary 31
Pap, I. S. (2017, 3 November). A Kádár-rendszerről álmodoznak a magyarok [Hungarians remi-
nisce of the Kádár system]. Mérce. https://merce.hu/2017/11/03/a-kadar-rendszerrol-
almodoznak-a-magyarok/. Accessed 2 Mar 2020.
Sandbag. (n.d.). EUA price. https://sandbag.org.uk/carbon-price-viewer/. Accessed 7 Jan 2020.
Sattich, T. (2018). The international reverberations of Germany’s Energiewende: Geoeconomics in
the EU’s geo-energy space. In D. Scholten (Ed.), The geopolitics of renewables (pp. 163–185).
New York: Springer.
Scheiring, G. (2018). Lessons from the political economy of authoritarian capitalism in Hungary.
Challenging Authoritarianism Series, no. 1. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. https://www.
tni.org/files/publication-downloads/tni-authoritarian-capitalism-in-hungary.pdf. Accessed
28 Feb 2020.
Stern, J. (2017). The future of gas in decarbonising European energy markets: The need for a new




Szabo, J., & Deak, A. (2020). The CEE energy transition: Recurring 50 year old dynamics? In
M. Matúš & V. Oravcová (Eds.), From economic to energy transition – Three decades of
transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Szabo, J., & Fabok, M. (2020). Infrastructures and state-building: Comparing the energy politics of
the European Commission with the governments of Hungary and Poland. Energy Policy, 138,
111253. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111253.
Szvák, G. (Ed.) (2016). A magyarok orosz-képe (2006–2016) [Hungarians’ image of Russians
(2006–2016)]. Budapest: Russica Pannonica. https://www.russianstudies.hu/docs/Poszt.szovjet.
f%C3%BCzetek.22..pdf Accessed 2 Mar 2020.
TNM Regulation 7/2006 (V. 24.). https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid¼a0600007.tnm. Accessed
20 Dec 2019.
Ürge-Vorsatz, D., Miladinova, G., & Paizs, L. (2006). Energy in transition: From the iron curtain to
the European Union. Energy Policy, 34(15), 2279–2297. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
enpol.2005.03.007.
VGF & HKL. (2013). A magyar olaj és földgáz története VI [The history of Hungary’s oil and natural
gas]. Víz, Gáz, Fűtéstechnika és Hűtő, Klíma, Légtechnika szaklap, 14(9). https://www.vgfszaklap.
hu/lapszamok/2013/szeptember/3000-a-magyar-olaj-es-foldgaz-tortenete-vi. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
Weiner, C. (2017). Managing energy supply security and gas diversification in Hungary: Putting
theory into practice. IWE working papers, no. 238. Budapest: Institute of World Economics,
MTA KRTK. http://real.mtak.hu/73435/1/WP_238_Weiner.pdf. Accessed 10 Feb 2020.
Weiner, C. (2019). Revisiting the management of stationary fuel supply security and gas diversi-
fication in Hungary. IWE working papers, no. 254. Budapest: Institute of World Economics,
MTA KRTK. http://real.mtak.hu/94539/1/WP254_Weiner_Fuel_supply_security.pdf. Accessed
1 Oct 2019.
Wilkin, P. (2016). Hungary’s crisis of democracy: The road to serfdom. Lanham/Maryland:
Lexington Books.
32 J. Szabo et al.
